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Loan Meme Docs
中文 Not deployed
The Yeti looks out over a snowy mountain range at a glowing portal on the peak, under the aurora

Start here

Park the ticker. Walk out with cash. Isolated books. Ranked LTVs. Revenue buys the meme.

LOAN MEME is a memecoin that owns a lending protocol, not a protocol that rented a mascot. You post a meme as collateral in its own book (one market: one meme, one stable), borrow stables against it, and take it back when you repay.

Nothing is deployed yet, no contracts, no markets, no token address. Anything circulating today that claims to be LOAN MEME is not ours.

What it is, what it is not

Two boards either side of the Yeti. It is: one book per meme, with its own lenders, cap and LTV; the Yeti is the face, the protocol runs the liquidations; the first serious meme running a lending market. It is not: a bank or equity; official anything; a yield farm or advice.
LTV is the share of your meme's value you can borrow, and one meme dying doesn't touch the next book. Deposits are not insured, the token is not a share, no exchange, brokerage or chain endorses or partners with it, and everything here can lose money.

Who should stay out

Borrowers can lose the posted meme, permanently. Lenders can lose part of their deposit. Stay out if: you borrow, with the posted meme at stake, and you need the meme back on a fixed date, or you cannot survive being liquidated at a bad price; you lend, with part of your deposit at stake, and you are lending money you need next month, or you expect a backstop that always pays. There is none.
Videos the Yeti drops a bag (the meme) at the ice window and walks out with a brick (the loan). If they ever disagree with these docs, the docs are right.

Roadmap and status

Nothing is deployed. This page says what has to be true before each next thing ships, and lists every parameter still waiting on a number.

Status right now

ContractsNoneNo mainnet or testnet deployment exists.
AuditNot startedNothing is finished enough to audit yet.
TokenNo addressAnything circulating today is not ours.
Books open0No meme has a market.
Total borrowed0There is nothing to borrow from.
Bad debt0Trivially, since nothing is lent.
A status page is not a launch date

The phases below are ordered, not scheduled. We publish a date for a phase only once the phase before it has closed. A roadmap with dates we cannot keep is worse than no dates at all.

The phases

Each phase lists what has to be true to leave it. Nothing moves on a calendar, it moves when the exit criteria are met.

  1. 01Parameters signed offwhere we are

    Every number in these docs currently marked TBD gets a value, a rationale and an owner.

    Exit whenNo TBD is left in these docs
    DateTBD
  2. 02Testnetpublic

    Contracts deployed to a public testnet with at least one book and a working liquidation path.

    Exit whenA liquidation has run end to end in public
    DateTBD
  3. 03Auditexternal

    The contracts are audited before any book opens. Until that is done, no parameter above is live and no money is at stake. See Governance and parameters.

    Exit whenThe audit is complete
    DateTBD
  4. 04Mainnet, caps lowfirst books

    One chain, a small number of books, borrow caps set well under what pool depth alone would allow. Senior vault only.

    Exit whenCaps hold through a real drawdown
    DateTBD
  5. 05T3 books and the junior vaultif it holds

    Thin books open, and with them the junior tranche. This is the phase that can be cancelled: if the waterfall on Senior and junior cannot be built so that junior losses stay inside their own book, junior does not ship and T3 stays closed.

    Exit whenTranching audited separately
    May not shipSaid plainly, not quietly dropped
  6. 06More chainslater

    A second chain only after the first has been through a full cycle including at least one liquidation cascade. The chains table on Oracle and listing stays empty until each one is actually live.

The Yeti in its lab pours a meme flask and a stables flask together to show how a loan works

How a loan works

Deposit a listed meme. Borrow stables against it, up to what its league allows. Interest runs while the loan is open. Repay and get the meme back.

The four steps

One position, start to finish. Every book has two sides: lenders put stables in, you put the meme in and take stables out. Steps 1 and 2 happen in the same transaction. Step 3 runs on its own until you do step 4.

Four flasks in front of the Yeti, left to right: deposit the meme, borrow stables against it, interest grows the debt, repay to get the meme back.
Fig. 1 One position, four stages. No due date: it stays open until you repay or get liquidated.
  1. 01Depositmeme in

    You send a listed meme into its own book (its own wallet). It stays locked there. It is not lent out, not staked and not used to farm anything.

    You sendThe meme
    You getA borrow limit
  2. 02Borrowstables out

    The book values your meme at its TWAP: the average price in its main pool over a time window, not the last trade. You can borrow up to a set share of that value, the max LTV of the ticker's league. Borrow less and the meme has room to drop. A 2.5% origination fee comes off what you receive: borrow $10,000 and you get $9,750, and owe $10,000.

    Your limitMeme value × league max LTV
    You getUSD or the chain stable, less 2.5%
  3. 03Pay interestdebt grows

    Interest is added to your debt as time passes, at that book's borrow rate. Nothing is due on a schedule. The debt just grows, and the loan drifts toward liquidation even at a flat price.

    RateVariable, per book
    Due dateNone
  4. 04Repaymeme back

    Pay back the stables plus interest, plus a 2.5% repayment fee on what you repay, and the meme unlocks.

    You sendStables + interest + 2.5%
    You getThe meme back
There is no repayment date

The loan stays open as long as it stays healthy. What ends it early is price and interest, not a calendar. See Liquidations.

Health factor

One number tells you how close you are to liquidation. At 1 or above you are fine. Below 1, anyone can liquidate you.

health factor = (collateral value × liquidation threshold) / debt
HF ≥ 1 → fine HF < 1 → liquidatable
A scale of the health factor. A hard line marks 1.0: left of it the loan is liquidatable by anyone, right of it the loan is fine. A marker labelled "you" sits on the safe side. Repaying debt and adding more of the same meme push you right, away from the line. Interest accruing and the TWAP price falling push you left, toward it. RAISES HF repay debt add more of the same meme HF < 1 anyone can liquidate you HF ≥ 1 fine 1.0 you LOWERS HF interest accrues TWAP price falls A scale of the health factor. A hard line marks 1.0: left of it the loan is liquidatable by anyone, right of it the loan is fine. A marker labelled "you" sits on the safe side. Repaying debt and adding more of the same meme push you right, away from the line. Interest accruing and the TWAP price falling push you left, toward it. RAISES HF repay debt add more of the same meme HF < 1 anyone can liquidate you HF ≥ 1 fine 1.0 you LOWERS HF interest accrues TWAP price falls
Fig. 2 The four things that move your health factor. Two of them are yours to control; the other two happen whether you are watching or not.
  • last trade TWAP liquidation level one-block spike: not saved one-block wick: not liquidated time → last trade TWAP liquidation level one-block spike: not saved one-block wick: not liquidated time →

    Collateral value uses the TWAP, not the last trade. A one block wick does not liquidate you, and it does not save you either.

  • league threshold your debt room less room demotion takes effect time → league threshold your debt room less room demotion takes effect time →

    The liquidation threshold comes from the league. If the ticker drops a league, the tighter threshold applies to your open loan once the change takes effect. Notice period TBD

  • collateral × threshold debt HF < 1 time → collateral × threshold debt HF < 1 time →

    Your debt grows with interest, so a loan you never touch drifts toward liquidation even at a flat price.

  • collateral debt add the same meme repay collateral debt add the same meme repay

    You raise HF two ways: repay some debt, or add more of the same meme.

What you cannot do

  • Borrow memes. Memes only go in as collateral. What comes out is stables.

  • Borrow against a ticker that is not listed. See listing checklist.

  • Borrow 70% against a two day old ticker. New tickers start in T3, the lowest limit. A good wallet score adds +5 LTV points at most, never +20.

  • Get a higher LTV because of who is promoting the token. Rank is set on the token. See Leagues.

  • Open a new borrow while the ticker's pool is too thin. That book pauses new borrows until the pool recovers. Repaying still works. See the pause rule.

  • Use MEME_A to back a borrow in the MEME_B book. Every book stands alone.

The risk, on this page

You can lose the deposited meme

If the price falls far enough, or interest piles up, anyone can liquidate you. They repay part of your debt and take that much of your meme, plus a 12% bonus (10 to 15% depending on the book). You keep the stables you borrowed. The meme they took does not come back, even if the price recovers an hour later. There is no warning, no grace period and no appeal.

The Yeti beside a three step podium: T3 lowest, T2 in the middle, T1 highest, each with a rising vial

Leagues and rank

Your LTV is ranked on the token first, not on the influencer promoting it.

LTV is the share of your meme's value you can borrow. Every listed meme sits in a league, and the league sets two numbers for its book: the max LTV, and the liquidation threshold, the level where your loan can be liquidated. A two day old ticker with a thin pool does not get the terms of one that has survived a year with real depth.

A higher league means better terms, not a safer meme. T1 tickers dump too.

The three leagues

TBD, the ranges below are the working shape, not signed off parameters. Final values land here before the first market opens.

LeagueWho gets inMax LTVLiquidationCap on borrow
T3 New ticker, thin book. Meets the minimum listing bar and nothing more. ~30%~38%Small
T2 Has age, has real volume, LP locked. ~45 to 50%~58%Medium
T1 Survivor. Deep book, mint authority dead. ~55 to 60%~65%Larger
Note

All these numbers are estimates. Each meme will have its own dedicated numbers and mathematics, shown in our app.

What moves a ticker up

  • Age. Time on chain without an incident. There is no shortcut.
  • Depth in its main pool. Enough liquidity that liquidating the book's full borrow cap does not crash the price.
  • Real volume, held over time. Not one day of fake trades.
  • LP locked, verifiably, for a meaningful term.
  • Mint and freeze authority revoked. Required to be listed at all. Nothing moves up without it.

What never moves LTV

Does not count
  • Tweets, follower counts, engagement.
  • "We are partners with…"
  • Team or treasury allocation size.
  • A listing on a centralised venue.
  • Paying us. There is no paid tier.
  • Being a friend of the protocol.
Counts
  • Pool depth you can measure on chain.
  • Days since deploy.
  • Realised volume over a window.
  • Locked LP, with the lock verifiable.
  • Authorities revoked.
  • Survival through a real drawdown.

Borrow caps and pool depth

The league sets your LTV. The borrow cap sets how much the book as a whole can carry, and it is not a judgement call: it is derived from the canonical pool's depth, because the pool is where every liquidation has to be sold.

The requirement is that liquidating the book's entire outstanding debt at once should still be a trade a liquidator would take. That means the sale has to clear under the break-even slippage from the floor, with margin.

Borrow cap against pool depthinputs TBD
cap  ≤  depthpool × κleague
κ = ( starget / (1 − starget) ) / (1 + b)
depth is the value of the meme side of the canonical pool. starget is the most slippage a full-book liquidation may cause. b is the liquidation bonus. The second line is just the first solved for a constant-product pool. The formula is settled; starget is not yet set for any league.
LeagueSlippage targetκ, cap as a share of pool depth
T1TBDderived from starget
T2TBDderived from starget
T3TBDderived from starget

The slippage target is the only free choice here; once it is set, κ follows from the formula. The constraint it has to satisfy is that a full-book liquidation still clears, which means starget has to sit under the break-even slippage the liquidation bonus can absorb. See the floor.

Lower leagues will get a smaller share of depth, not because thin pools deserve punishment, but because their depth is less reliable: a thin pool can halve overnight, and the cap has to survive the gap between recomputations. That ordering is settled even though the values are not.

How often it is recomputed

On a scheduleDaily, from the pool's depth averaged over the preceding window rather than its depth at one instant.
On a league changeImmediately, since κ changes with the league.
Downward, any timeLowering a cap is a fast-class change with no timelock, because it cannot make an existing position worse. See Governance and parameters.
UpwardStandard class, with the full delay. Raising a cap adds risk, so it waits.

What happens when the cap is hit

  • New borrows in that book pause. Only that book, and only borrowing.
  • Everything else keeps working: repay, withdraw collateral, lend, liquidate. See Emergency procedures.
  • It clears by itself as borrowers repay, or when the cap is raised through the timelock.
  • A cap cut can put a book over its cap without liquidating anyone. Existing loans run on untouched; the book simply stays closed to new borrowing until debt falls back under.
Borrow cap is not utilisation cap

The borrow cap is an absolute ceiling on debt, set by the pool. Utilisation is the ratio of borrowed to supplied, and it gates lender withdrawals and sets the rate. A book can be at 100% utilisation and nowhere near its cap, if lenders have simply not supplied much. See Interest rates.

Moving down

Everything that moves a ticker up can move it back down: depth leaves, volume was fake, an LP lock lapses, an authority reappears. A demotion tightens the liquidation threshold on every open loan in that book, so it can make you liquidatable without the price moving at all.

There is a notice period before it takes effect, and the mechanics, the timelock class and what happens to existing positions are on League demotion. If a ticker stops meeting the listing bar entirely, the book is wound down rather than demoted: see Delisting and wind-down.

Interest rates

One formula, four numbers per book. The rate is not set by anyone day to day: it is a function of how much of the book is borrowed right now.

The formula is settled. The numbers are not.

Everything on this page that is an equation is the intended design. Every value that goes into it — base rate, kink, slope 1, slope 2 — is TBD. The one exception is the reserve factor, which is set at 20%. Where any other number appears below it is there to show the arithmetic working, not to state a parameter.

Utilisation drives everything

Utilisation is the share of a book's stables that is currently out on loan. It is the only input to the borrow rate.

Utilisationexact
U = borrowed / (borrowed + available)
All in the book's loan asset. A book with 700,000 USD lent out and 300,000 sitting free is at U = 0.70.

The rate curve

The borrow rate is a two-slope line with a kink at a target utilisation. Below the kink the rate rises gently, because we want the book used. Above it the rate rises steeply, because the last stables in a book are the ones lenders need to be able to withdraw, and the only lever that frees them is making the debt expensive.

Borrow rateinputs TBD
if U ≤ Ukink
  borrowAPR = base + (U / Ukink) × slope1

if U > Ukink
  borrowAPR = base + slope1 + ((U − Ukink) / (1 − Ukink)) × slope2
At U = 0 the rate is base. At the kink it is base + slope1. At U = 1 it is base + slope1 + slope2, which is the maximum rate the book can charge.
Max +slope 1 base 0% 50% 100% Kink At the kink the rate is base + slope 1 At full utilisation the rate is base + slope 1 + slope 2 slope 1: gentle slope 2: steep Utilisation Max +slope 1 base 0% 50% 100% Kink At the kink the rate is base + slope 1 At full utilisation the rate is base + slope 1 + slope 2 slope 1: gentle slope 2: steep Utilisation
Fig. R1 The shape, not the values. The kink sits where the league's parameters put it, which is not yet decided. The steep leg above it is the mechanism that gets lenders their money back, so the thinner the book the steeper it has to be.

What lenders earn

Interest paid by borrowers is split between the lenders in that book and the protocol. The protocol's cut is the reserve factor. Everything else goes to the lenders, spread over the whole book, including the part that is not currently lent out.

Lender rateinputs TBD
supplyAPR = borrowAPR × U × (1 − reserveFactor)
The × U is why an idle book pays almost nothing: only the borrowed part earns, but the yield is shared across every deposit. See Lenders.

The arithmetic, with the 20% reserve factor and arbitrary inputs for the other two terms: a book at U = 0.70 and a borrow rate of 12% would pay lenders 12% × 0.70 × 0.80 = 6.72%, and route 1.68% of the book to the protocol. The utilisation and the borrow rate are not decided values.

How interest is added

There is no payment schedule. Interest compounds into your debt continuously, by a per-second index. Your debt is not stored as a number of stables, it is stored as a share of that index, so every open loan accrues without anyone touching it.

Interest accrualexact
indext = indext−1 × (1 + borrowAPR / 31,536,000)Δt
debt = principalShares × indext
Δt is the number of seconds since the last time the book was touched. 31,536,000 is seconds in a 365-day year. The index only moves forward, so a book nobody interacts with for a week still charges that week.

APR and APY, and which one you see

APR is the rate before compounding. APY is what you actually end up paying or earning once the per-second compounding is applied. This conversion is arithmetic, not a parameter: it holds whatever the league values turn out to be.

APR to APYexact
APY = (1 + APR / 31,536,000)31,536,000 − 1
A 12% APR is a 12.75% APY. A 60% APR is an 82.2% APY. The gap widens fast, which is why the two are never used interchangeably in these docs.
The app shows APY on both sides

Borrow cost and lender yield are both displayed as APY, because that is the number you actually experience. Where a figure in these docs is an APR it says so. The contracts store an APR; the interface converts it.

Per-league defaults

Four numbers per league, none of them set yet, plus the reserve factor, which is 20% in every league. The table below is the shape the sign-off has to fill in, and the rate columns are published empty rather than filled with a guess.

LeagueBaseKinkSlope 1Slope 2Max rateReserve factor
T1 TBDTBD TBDTBD base + slope 1 + slope 220%
T2 TBDTBD TBDTBD base + slope 1 + slope 220%
T3 TBDTBD TBDTBD base + slope 1 + slope 220%

All values will be APR. The one property the set has to satisfy is directional: the thinner and newer the book, the lower the kink and the steeper slope 2, because a thin book cannot afford to sit pinned at full utilisation while lenders wait. That constraint is settled even though the numbers are not.

A flat price can still liquidate you

Interest is added to your debt, so your health factor falls even when the meme has not moved. How long a loan survives on a flat chart is set entirely by the rate and the gap between max LTV and the liquidation threshold, which is why those numbers are the ones worth arguing about. See Worked examples.

Fees

Every fee the protocol charges, in one table, with a number in every row. Where a fee is zero it says zero rather than going unmentioned.

The whole list

Nothing charges a fee that is not on this table. If you find a charge that is not listed here, it is a bug and we want to hear about it.

FeeRate
Deposit fee2.5%
Withdrawal fee2.5%
Origination fee2.5%
Repayment fee2.5%
Reserve factor20%
Liquidation bonus12% of repaid debt (10–15% by book)
Liquidation protocol share10% of that bonus
Listing fee0
Performance fee on lender yield0

Where the money actually goes

There are three sources of protocol revenue: the 2.5% fee on every deposit, withdrawal, borrow and repayment; the 20% reserve factor on borrow interest; and 10% of the liquidation bonus. All three land in the book they came from, and all three serve that book's reserve before anything leaves.

2.5% fees deposit, withdraw, borrow, repay Borrow interest 20% reserve factor Liquidation bonus 10% protocol share The book's reserve paid before anything else surplus Buyback contract only once the target is met Book carrying bad debt sends nothing out, ever 2.5% fees deposit, withdraw, borrow, repay Borrow interest 20% reserve factor Liquidation bonus 10% protocol share The book's reserve paid before anything else surplus Buyback contract only once the target is met Book carrying bad debt sends nothing out, ever
Fig. F1 Fees are per book. A book with bad debt outstanding routes nothing to buybacks until the hole is closed, so a loss in one book cannot be papered over with another book's revenue.

Costs that are not our fees

These cost you money but none of it reaches the protocol. We list them because leaving them out is how a fee table becomes dishonest.

  • Gas. Paid to the chain on every deposit, borrow, repay and withdrawal.
  • Swap slippage. If you sell the borrowed stables, or buy them back to repay, the price you get is the market's, not ours.
  • The liquidator's bonus. The part that does not go to the reserve goes to whoever liquidated you. It is a cost of being liquidated, not a protocol fee, and it is set out on Liquidations.
  • The spread on the loan asset. Acquiring or exiting USD has its own cost wherever you do it.
Fees cannot be changed quietly

Every fee on this page is a timelocked parameter, enforced by the audited contract. A change is announced before it takes effect, and every change is logged on Governance and parameters.

Worked examples

Three positions, carried through with every number shown: one that ends well, one that gets liquidated, and one that leaves a hole. You can check the arithmetic.

These are illustrations, not listings

MEME_A, MEME_B and MEME_C are stand-ins. No ticker is listed, no book exists, and every parameter used below — the LTVs, the thresholds, the rates, the close factor — is TBD, picked here only so the arithmetic has something to run on. The fees are the real ones from Fees: 2.5% to borrow and 2.5% to repay, the 20% reserve factor, and the 12% bonus with 10% of it to the reserve. The method is what is fixed, not the values. Change any input and every figure downstream moves.

1. A healthy loan, open to repaid

MEME_A, a T1 book: max LTV 60%, liquidation threshold 65%, borrow rate 6.30% APR at the book's current utilisation, reserve factor 20%.

StepWhat happensNumbers
Deposit 100,000 MEME_A into the book, valued at the TWAP of $2.40 Collateral = 100,000 × $2.40 = $240,000
Borrow limit The league's max LTV is 60% $240,000 × 0.60 = $144,000
Borrow You take well under the limit, on purpose $100,000 USD, an LTV of 41.7%
Origination fee 2.5% of the borrow, taken from what you receive You receive $97,500 and owe $100,000
Health factor Threshold is 65%, not the 60% borrow limit (240,000 × 0.65) / 100,000 = 1.56
90 days pass Interest compounds per second at 6.30% APR 100,000 × e0.063 × 90/365 = $101,565.55
Interest split $1,565.55 of interest, 20% of it to the reserve Lenders $1,252.44, reserve $313.11
Price drifts down MEME_A TWAP is $2.10 when you come back Collateral = $210,000
Health factor now Lower on both sides, still comfortable (210,000 × 0.65) / 101,565.55 = 1.34
Repay You pay the debt in full, plus the 2.5% repayment fee, and the book unlocks the meme $101,565.55 + $2,539.14 = $104,104.69, get 100,000 MEME_A back

The loan cost $6,604.69: $1,565.55 of interest, which is 1.57% of the principal over 90 days or 6.50% APY, plus $5,039.14 in origination and repayment fees. Each fee is charged once, however long the loan stays open, so on a 90-day loan the fees are most of the cost. The meme fell 12.5% while the loan was open and nothing happened, because the position was opened at 41.7% LTV rather than at the 60% ceiling. That gap is the entire reason this example ends with the meme coming back.

2. A liquidation

MEME_B, a T2 book: max LTV 50%, liquidation threshold 58%, borrow rate 15% APR, liquidation bonus 12%, close factor 50%, protocol share of the bonus 10%. Same borrower behaviour as above, but closer to the limit and on a thinner book.

StepWhat happensNumbers
Open 5,000,000 MEME_B at a TWAP of $0.0200, borrow $48,000, receive $46,800 after the 2.5% fee Collateral $100,000, LTV 48%
Health factor Only 8 points of threshold above the borrow (100,000 × 0.58) / 48,000 = 1.21
60 days pass Interest at 15% APR Debt = $49,198.27
Price falls 20% TWAP prints $0.0160 Collateral = $80,000
Health factor Below 1. From this block, anyone can liquidate. (80,000 × 0.58) / 49,198.27 = 0.943
Repay A liquidator repays the close factor, half the debt. The repayment fee does not apply to a liquidation. R = $24,599.14
Seize They take that value plus the 12% bonus, priced at the same TWAP $24,599.14 × 1.12 = $27,551.03 = 1,721,940 MEME_B
Bonus split The $2,951.90 bonus is split, and it comes out of the seizure, not out of extra collateral Liquidator $2,656.71, reserve $295.19
Recheck Debt $24,599.14, collateral 3,278,060 MEME_B worth $52,448.96 HF = 1.24, so it stops here

What it cost each side

Borrower−$2,951.90184,494 MEME_B taken over and above the debt cleared. They keep the $46,800 they received at open and still owe $24,599.14.
Liquidator+$1,170.92After handing 10% of the bonus to the reserve, selling the rest of the seized meme at 5% slippage and paying 0.5% in gas and flashloan cost.
Lenders±$0$24,599.14 of stables came back into the book. Nothing was lost. The reserve gained $295.19.

The liquidation worked because 12% sits inside both bounds at this threshold: the ceiling at L = 0.58 is 1/0.58 − 1 = 72%, and the floor at 5% exit slippage is about 5.8%. Health factor went up, from 0.943 to 1.24, which is the whole point. See the two bounds.

3. A bad debt event

MEME_C, a T3 book: max LTV 30%, liquidation threshold 38%, borrow rate 14% APR, bonus 12%. The borrower did nothing unusual. The token gapped.

StepWhat happensNumbers
Open 20,000,000 MEME_C at a TWAP of $0.0050, borrow $29,000, receive $28,275 after the 2.5% fee Collateral $100,000, HF 1.31
16 days pass Interest at 14% APR Debt = $29,178.52
The token gaps MEME_C falls 76% in under an hour. The TWAP lags, then prints $0.0012. Collateral = $24,000
Health factor Far below 1, and the collateral no longer covers the debt at all (24,000 × 0.38) / 29,178.52 = 0.31
Maximum a liquidator can repay They cannot seize more meme than exists, so the repay is capped by the collateral itself $24,000 / 1.12 = $21,428.57
Seize Every remaining token goes. The borrower's collateral is now zero. 20,000,000 MEME_C
What is left Debt with nothing behind it. This is bad debt. $29,178.52 − $21,428.57 = $7,749.95

Where the $7,749.95 lands

The loss is absorbed in the order set out on Bad debt: the book's reserve first, then junior, then senior. This book is T3, so senior was never in it.

LayerCapacityAbsorbsLeft to absorb
MEME_C book reserve$2,400$2,400, all of it$5,349.95
Junior, in this book$120,000$5,349.95$0
SeniorNot present$0$0

Junior's stake in the MEME_C book falls from $120,000 to $114,650.05, a 4.46% write-down on that book's junior share price. A junior depositor whose vault had $600,000 spread over several books sees the vault's share price fall 0.89%, because only the MEME_C slice was hit. A lender who never had exposure to MEME_C loses nothing at all.

And if nobody liquidates

The example above assumes a liquidator turns up. At 8% exit slippage one does: selling $24,000 of MEME_C nets $22,080 against a $21,428.57 repay and $107 of costs, for $544 of profit. At 25% slippage, which is the realistic number for a token that just fell 76%, the same trade loses $3,536 and nobody clears it. The position then sits there, interest still accruing, until either the price recovers or the book is wound down. Bad debt of $7,749.95 was the good outcome.

Checking these yourself

Every figure above is reproducible from the formulas on Interest rates and How a loan works. Two things to know if you are rebuilding them against the contracts rather than a calculator:

  • Work in integers. The contracts hold balances as token base units and rates in ray, meaning 27 decimals. Reproduce the arithmetic in BigInt, not floating point, or you will disagree with the chain in the last few digits and chase it for an afternoon.
  • Rounding is directional. Debt rounds up and collateral rounds down, always against the borrower and never against the book. Over a single position the difference is dust; it is deliberate.
  • The TWAP is the price, everywhere. Health factor, borrow limit and the seizure in a liquidation all use the same window, read in the same block. There is no second price anywhere in the system.
The Yeti beside a chalkboard: stables in, memes locked, you earn interest, senior vs junior, utilisation, and how you lose money

Lenders

You put stables in. Borrowers put memes in and pay you interest. This page says how it works.

Where your USD goes

You deposit the loan asset: USD or the chain stable, depending on the deployment. It sits in a book and is lent to borrowers who have locked that book's meme against it. Your return is the interest they pay, minus the protocol's 20% share. Depositing and withdrawing each cost 2.5%. See Fees.

You are only exposed to the books you lend into. A book you are not in cannot cost you anything. Which books you are in is your choice at deposit, and it is the only exposure you have.

Senior and junior, in short

Two claims on the same book, in a fixed order: junior is written down first and paid more for it. The summary is below; the waterfall, the subordination cap, the rate split and the wipeout case are all on Senior and junior. TBD, ships only if we can build it right

 SeniorJunior
Lends intoT1 books onlyAny league, T1 to T3
LossesA T1 book going bad. Rarer, not impossible.Takes the first loss. New and thin books are where memes die.
RateExpected lowerExpected higher
Who it is forYou want interest on stables and accept smart contract risk and the odd bad T1 book.You accept being first in line when a thin meme book goes bad, and that you can lose part of your deposit.
You can lose money in junior

That is what junior is. If a T2 or T3 book ends up with bad debt after liquidation, junior lenders take that loss. The higher rate is the payment for it. If you are not comfortable being first in line on thin memecoin books, lend in senior or somewhere else.

Utilisation and getting your money out

Utilisation is the share of a book's stables that is borrowed right now. It sets the borrow rate and it decides whether you can withdraw right now.

  • Low utilisation. Plenty of free stables, you can withdraw, your rate is low.
  • High utilisation. Rates rise, which pays you more and pushes borrowers to repay.
  • At 100%. There is nothing free to withdraw. You wait for a repayment or for new deposits. The book is not broke and nothing is bugged, but your money is stuck until then.
  • Junior has two extra gates. A withdrawal cooldown, and the subordination cap: taking junior out of a book that is at its senior limit is blocked until senior leaves too. See Deposits and withdrawals.

How you lose money, in order of likelihood

Ordered by how often it happens, not by how much it costs. The two do not line up: the most likely loss is not the largest, and the largest sits near the bottom. The badge on each row says what is actually at stake.

Most likely
  1. 01
    Bad debt in a book you lend into Deposit

    A meme gaps down faster than liquidations can keep up, the collateral no longer covers the debt, and the gap lands on that book's lenders. Lenders in other books lose nothing.

    TriggerA price gap through the liquidation point
    HitsThe vault lending to that book: junior for T2 and T3, senior for T1
    You losePart of your deposit
  2. 02
    You cannot withdraw when you want to Access

    Utilisation is pinned at 100% and you are locked in at exactly the moment you want out. Your balance is intact. You just cannot reach it until a borrower repays or new deposits arrive.

    TriggerUtilisation at 100%
    HitsEvery lender in that book
    You loseAccess, not your deposit
  3. 03
    Rate collapse Yield

    Borrowers repay, utilisation drops, and you earn close to nothing while your stables sit idle. Nothing has gone wrong. The book is simply not being used.

    TriggerBorrow demand dries up
    HitsEvery lender in that book
    You loseYield, not your deposit
  4. 04
    Smart contract failure Deposit

    A bug in the market, the locker that holds the memes, the price feed or the fee router. Unlikely, and by far the worst: it can take everything, and it does not care which vault you are in or which league the book was.

    TriggerA bug or an exploit
    HitsSenior and junior alike
    You losePotentially all of it
  5. 05
    The stable loses its peg Deposit

    You hold the loan asset. If USD or the chain stable stops being worth $1, that is your loss, and nothing in this protocol offsets it. The book still balances, in a token that is worth less.

    TriggerLoan asset loses its peg
    HitsEvery lender, every book
    You loseValue of the deposit
Least likely
There is no insurance fund that always pays

A reserve exists per book, funded from that book's own revenue, and it covers a few percent of that book's debt. It absorbs small losses before lenders are touched. It is not a guarantee, it is not a backstop for a large event, and we will not describe it as one. See The reserve.

Senior and junior

Two claims on the same book, in a fixed order. Junior is paid more because junior is written down first. This page is the order, the cap, the rate split, and the case where junior runs out.

This may not ship

Tranching is the most original thing in this protocol and the least common in DeFi lending, which means it is the part with the fewest other people's mistakes to learn from. It ships only if the waterfall below can be built so that a junior loss stays inside the book it happened in. If it cannot, junior does not launch, T3 books stay closed, and we say so here rather than shipping a weaker version under the same name.

Why two tranches at all

A single lender pool over memecoin books has one price for a very wide range of risk. The lender who wants 5% on stables and the lender who wants 20% and knows what they are buying both get the same blended number, and the first one is quietly funding the second one's upside. Splitting the claim lets each price their own risk.

This is closer to private credit than to Aave. Aave mutualises losses across the whole pool and backstops them with a staked module. Morpho, Euler and Silo socialise losses per market with no backstop at all. Here the loss is per book, and ordered inside the book. See What makes us different.

The loss waterfall

When a book ends up with bad debt, the shortfall is absorbed in this order, and only ever by money that was in that book.

Shortfall in one book debt left with no collateral 1 · The book's reserve absorbs up to its balance remainder 2 · Junior, in this book to zero before senior is touched remainder 3 · Senior, in this book only after junior is gone Stops here. It never reaches another book. Every other book its own reserve, its own junior and senior, untouched by this Shortfall in one book debt left with no collateral 1 · The book's reserve absorbs up to its balance remainder 2 · Junior, in this book to zero before senior is touched remainder 3 · Senior, in this book only after junior is gone Stops here. It never reaches another book. Every other book its own reserve, its own junior and senior, untouched by this
Fig. T1 The waterfall runs inside one book. Junior is subordinated to senior in the book they are both in, and nowhere else. Junior money in the MEME_C book does not stand behind senior money in the MEME_A book.

Junior does not backstop across books

This is the question worth being precise about, because the answer changes what you are buying.

What junior does
  • Takes the first loss in every book it is allocated to, down to zero, before senior in that same book loses a cent.
  • Gets paid a higher rate in that book for doing it.
  • Can be allocated to books in any league, including T1.
What junior does not do
  • Cover losses in a book it never funded.
  • Act as a protocol-wide insurance fund. There is no such thing here.
  • Get topped up by profits from other books after a write-down.

Which books each tranche may enter

 SeniorJunior
May be allocated toT1 books onlyAny league, T1 through T3
Position in the bookPaid last in loss, paid first in interestWritten down first, paid the residual
Expected rateLower, and less variableHigher, and it can be negative in a bad month
Loses money whenA T1 book's loss is bigger than all the junior in itAny book it is in takes any loss at all
WithdrawalSubject to free liquiditySubject to free liquidity and the subordination cap and cooldown below
Who it is forYou want interest on stables, accept smart contract risk, and accept that a T1 meme can still die badly enough to eat through junior.You are pricing memecoin credit risk on purpose, you understand you are first in line, and you can lose most or all of the deposit.

The junior-to-senior cap

Senior's protection is only as thick as the junior sitting under it, so a book cannot take unlimited senior money against a thin junior layer. Every book carries a maximum ratio.

Subordination capinputs TBD
seniorbook ≤ Rmax × juniorbook
Rmax: TBD
The ratio decides how much of a book's lender capital can be lost before senior is touched at all. A lower ratio makes senior safer and junior's yield smaller, because there is less senior money paying junior for the protection. That trade-off is the decision; the number is not made yet.

What the cap does in practice:

  • New senior deposits are refused into a book already at the cap. The deposit is not queued and nothing fails silently: the book is simply closed to senior until more junior arrives.
  • Junior withdrawals are blocked if taking the money out would push the book over the cap. This is the most important thing to understand before depositing junior: your exit can be gated by senior's presence, not only by utilisation.
  • A breach from a loss does not force-liquidate anyone. If a write-down pushes the ratio past the cap, the book stops accepting senior and stops opening new borrows until it is back inside. Existing positions run on.

How the rate is split

The book earns one number: borrower interest, minus the reserve factor, as set out on Interest rates. That number is then split. Senior is paid its share first; junior takes whatever is left.

Interest splitinputs TBD
I = supplyAPRbook × (senior + junior)
senior gets  =  I × senior/(senior+junior) × (1 − d)
junior gets   =  I − senior gets
d is the subordination discount: the slice of senior's pro-rata interest that is handed to junior as payment for standing in front of it. Value TBD.

Worked: one book, one year

Illustrative only, to show how the split behaves. A book with $400,000 senior and $100,000 junior at a 4:1 ratio, paying lenders a blended 8%, with the discount set to 25%. None of those inputs is a decided value.

 CapitalPro-rata interestActually paidRate
Senior$400,000$32,000$24,0006.00%
Junior$100,000$8,000$16,00016.00%
Book total$500,000$40,000$40,0008.00%

Junior earns 16% instead of 8% because $8,000 a year is transferred from senior. That $8,000 is the price senior pays for a $100,000 buffer. Change the discount and every number in the last two columns moves; the mechanism does not. Whether it is a good trade depends on how often the buffer is used, which is what Risks is for.

The same book, with a loss

Shortfall in the bookReserve absorbsJunior absorbsSenior absorbsJunior share price
$5,000$5,000$0$0Unchanged
$35,000$5,000$30,000$0−30%
$105,000$5,000$100,000, all of it$0Zero
$135,000$5,000$100,000, all of it$30,000, or −7.5%Zero

Assuming a $5,000 reserve in the book. Senior's first cent of loss arrives only in the fourth row.

When junior is wiped out

A junior share price of zero is not a rounding problem, it is a terminal state for that tranche in that book. The following happens automatically, in the same transaction as the write-down.

  1. The junior tranche in that book is closed. No new junior deposits, because there is no positive share price to mint against. Existing junior holders in that book hold a claim worth zero, and it does not recover if the book later earns.
  2. New borrows pause in that book, under the same mechanism as the pool-depth pause. Repayments, withdrawals and liquidations all keep working. See Emergency procedures.
  3. Senior becomes the first-loss layer for anything further in that book, and is told so: the book is flagged in the interface and in the subgraph, and senior withdrawals are not gated while it is in this state.
  4. The book is scheduled for wind-down unless a fresh junior tranche is created and funded. See Delisting and wind-down.
Junior losses are realised, not deferred

There is no mechanism by which later interest in the same book restores a written-down junior holder, and none by which another book's profit does. If you want the write-down to be recoverable, you want senior.

Deposits and withdrawals

 SeniorJunior
DepositAny time, unless the book is at the subordination capAny time
Deposit fee2.5%2.5%
Withdrawal fee2.5%2.5%
Withdraw, liquidityLimited to the book's free stablesLimited to the book's free stables
Withdraw, capNot gated by the ratioBlocked if it would push the book past Rmax
CooldownNoneLength TBD. It exists so junior cannot exit into a gap the moment a price starts moving.
Withdraw while pausedYes, to the extent stables are freeYes, to the extent stables are free and the cap allows

The junior cooldown exists for one reason: without it, the first junior depositor to notice a meme wobbling exits at par and leaves the remaining junior holders carrying a loss that was, at the moment they were both in, shared. A cooldown makes that race unwinnable rather than merely unfair.

Open design questions

Published because they are not settled, and because a docs page that hides them is worse than useless to anyone deciding whether to lend.

Should senior be allowed into T2 books?

Today senior is T1 only. The argument for opening T2 is that a T2 book with a full junior layer under it may genuinely be safer than a T1 book at the cap, and the league is a crude proxy. The argument against is that it makes senior's risk depend on a second variable that a depositor now has to track per book. Unresolved.

Should the discount d vary by league?

A single flat discount would pay junior the same premium for standing in front of a T1 book as a T3 book, which under-prices T3 junior. A per-league discount fixes that and adds a parameter per book to govern. Leaning towards per-league, not decided.

Can one deposit be junior in one book and senior in another?

Mechanically yes, since the tranche is a property of the position in a book rather than of the depositor. Whether the interface should encourage it is a separate question. For now each deposit picks one tranche in one book, or goes through a vault that does the allocating.

Bad debt

Sometimes the collateral runs out before the debt does. This page is what happens next: when the loss is recognised, who absorbs it, in what order, and what your share price does the moment it lands.

What counts as bad debt

Bad debt is debt with no collateral behind it. Not a position that is merely underwater, and not a position nobody has liquidated yet: those are unhealthy positions, and they can recover. Bad debt is what is left when a liquidator has taken the last token and the debt is still not zero.

Bad debtexact
badDebt = debt − collateralValue,  once collateralTokens = 0
While collateralTokens > 0 there is still something to seize, so the position is unhealthy rather than bad. The two are counted and reported separately.

Two numbers, published separately

A book reports both, because reporting only the second is how a protocol looks solvent right up until it is not.

Unrealised shortfallMarked, not written down The sum, across open positions, of debt above collateral value. It has not touched anyone's share price. It can go back to zero if the price recovers.
Realised bad debtWritten down The sum of shortfalls on positions whose collateral is gone. It has already hit the share price of the lenders in that book. It does not recover.

When the loss is recognised

Immediately, in the same transaction as the final liquidation. Not carried, not amortised, not parked in a ledger to be dealt with later.

The reason is that any delay creates a race. If a book has a known hole and the share price still says otherwise, the lenders who withdraw first get out whole and the ones who were slow carry the whole loss. Recognising it on the spot means the share price is true at every block, and everyone still in the book at the moment the collateral ran out shares the loss in proportion.

There is still a window, and we will not pretend otherwise

Between the price gapping and the final liquidation clearing, the shortfall is unrealised, and a lender who withdraws in that window escapes a loss the rest will take. Three things narrow it: liquidation is permissionless so anyone can close the position, the shortfall is published the whole time so nobody is withdrawing on private information, and junior deposits carry a cooldown so the tranche that takes the first loss cannot exit into the gap. It is narrowed, not closed.

The order of absorption

Three layers, in this order, all of them inside the book that took the loss. The waterfall diagram is on Senior and junior.

OrderLayerCapacityWhat it does to you
1The book's reserve Whatever that book has accrued, capped at its balance Nothing. Lenders do not notice a loss this size.
2Junior, in this book The full junior balance in that book, down to zero Junior share price falls. See the wipeout case.
3Senior, in this book The full senior balance in that book Senior share price falls. Only reachable once junior is at zero.

The reserve is a per-book buffer funded out of that book's own revenue, as set out on Fees. It is drawn automatically, in the transaction that realises the loss, with no approval step and no discretion. Its target size is TBD, and whatever that number turns out to be, it is a buffer against small losses and not insurance against large ones.

What it does to your share price

Lender deposits are held as shares in a book, priced against the book's total assets. Writing down bad debt reduces total assets without changing the share count, so the price per share falls. Nothing is taken from your wallet; each share is simply worth less.

Lender share priceexact
sharePrice = (available + debtOutstanding − realisedBadDebt) / totalShares
Per book, per tranche. A withdrawal at the new price returns fewer stables for the same shares.

A 4.46% write-down on a junior tranche means 1,000 shares that were worth $1,000 are worth $955.40. The shares are still yours and they keep earning; they are earning on a smaller base.

Worked, end to end

The full arithmetic is example 3 on Worked examples. Every figure below is illustrative: the parameters it uses are not signed off.

 AmountNote
Debt outstanding$29,178.52After 16 days of interest at an illustrative 14% APR
Collateral left, at TWAP$24,000MEME_C fell 76%
Most a liquidator can repay$21,428.57$24,000 / 1.12, because they cannot seize more meme than exists
Bad debt realised$7,749.95Written down in the liquidating transaction
Reserve absorbs$2,400The whole reserve balance for that book
Junior absorbs$5,349.954.46% off the junior share price in that book
Senior absorbs$0T3 book, senior was never allowed in
The reserve is not a backstop and we will not call it one

Whatever the reserve target is set to, it will be a few percent of a book's debt. The event that actually hurts a memecoin book is a 40 to 80% gap, and against that the reserve is a rounding error. It exists to stop small losses reaching lenders, not to make lenders whole. Anyone describing it as insurance, including us on a bad day, is wrong.

After a book takes bad debt

  1. All buyback routing from that book stops. Every cent of that book's revenue rebuilds the reserve until it is back at target. A book carrying realised bad debt never contributes to a buyback. See The $LOAN Flywheel.
  2. The book is flagged in the interface and on chain, with the realised figure and the date.
  3. New borrows pause if junior was wiped out. If junior survived, the book keeps running and the pause rule on Emergency procedures applies as normal.
  4. The event is written up. What happened, what the parameters were, what we changed. Published whether or not anyone asks.
The Yeti checks its phone above a row of icons: verified, unlocked, liquidity, oracle drop, age, checkmark, and a gauge

Oracle and listing

Price comes from a TWAP of the canonical pool, not the last tick. If the pool is empty, new borrows pause. A ticker only gets a book if it passes every listing check.

Why TWAP, not last tick

The last tick is the price of the last trade in the pool. On a memecoin it is cheap to move. If collateral were priced off it, anyone could pump the price, borrow against the fake value and walk, or dump it and liquidate someone else for the bonus.

So every book prices its meme with a TWAP, a time weighted average price: the average price in the pool over a set window. To move a TWAP you have to hold the price away from the market for the whole window, which costs real money and gives everyone else time to trade against you.

SourceThe canonical pool: the one main pool for that token on the chain where the book lives, named at listing.
MethodTime weighted average price over a fixed window, set per league. Window length TBD, see Oracle specification below.
Not usedThe last tick. Prices from other pools or exchanges. Any price we cannot rebuild from chain data.
TradeoffA TWAP lags. In a fast dump it shows a price higher than the real one, which delays liquidation and makes bad debt more likely. That is the cost of a price that is expensive to manipulate, and it is one reason the LTVs are low.

Oracle specification

"We use a TWAP" is a decision, not a parameter set. On memecoins the oracle is the single most likely point of failure, so every number that defines it belongs here.

Window and cadence

LeagueTWAP windowMinimum observation cardinalityReasoning
T1TBDTBD Deepest pool, manipulation is most expensive, so this gets the shortest window and the freshest price.
T2TBDTBD Middle ground.
T3TBDTBD Thinnest pool and cheapest to push, so this gets the longest window: an attacker has to hold the price away from the market for all of it.

Cardinality is how many historical observations the pool stores. A pool that keeps too few cannot serve a window as long as we need, and the oracle read reverts rather than silently returning a shorter window. Cardinality is checked at listing and rechecked on every league change; if it is insufficient, the protocol grows it itself and pays the gas, once, at listing.

Who updatesNobody has to. The TWAP is read from the pool's own accumulator at the moment of the call, so it is computed fresh on every borrow, every health-factor read and every liquidation.
CadenceThere is no publishing cadence and no keeper to bribe or to fail. There is also no poke, so nothing goes stale through neglect.
Cost of that choiceEvery read costs gas, and the price is only as good as the pool's last trade activity.

Staleness

A TWAP read from an accumulator cannot be stale in the usual sense, but it can be built on observations that are all very old, which is the same problem wearing a different hat. A pool nobody has traded in for hours reports a confident average of a price that no longer exists.

Staleness testinputs TBD
stale  ≡  (now − lastObservationTimestamp) > staleAfter
staleAfter: TBD, expected to be defined as a multiple of that league's window rather than as an absolute number of seconds

On a stale read, in this order:

  1. New borrows in that book pause immediately. Nobody can take on debt against a price we do not trust.
  2. Liquidations pause too. This is the uncomfortable half of the rule: a stale price is as likely to liquidate someone wrongly as to miss a liquidation, and we would rather carry the risk than seize a borrower's meme on a price we have just declared untrustworthy.
  3. Repayments and withdrawals keep working. Both shrink the book's risk, and neither needs a reliable price to be safe.
  4. The book un-pauses on its own as soon as a fresh observation lands. No human step, no multisig transaction.

Deviation circuit breaker

A single read that jumps further than a plausible market move is treated as an attack until proven otherwise.

Deviation circuit breakerinputs TBD
|pricenow − pricelast accepted| / pricelast accepted > maxDeviation
maxDeviation: TBD, per window
A breach pauses new borrows and liquidations in that book for one full window. If the move is real, the second window confirms it and the book reopens at the new price. If it was manipulation, the attacker has paid to hold a price for two windows and got nothing for it.
A circuit breaker delays liquidations, which costs lenders

Pausing liquidations for a window on a genuine 30% crash means the book eats a window's worth of further downside before anyone can act. That is a real cost and it is the price of not being drained by a price that was never real. The deviation bound is set where it is because on a memecoin the second failure is more likely than the first.

When the canonical pool dies or moves

The canonical pool is named at listing and is the only price source for that book. Memecoin liquidity migrates: a new pool opens on a different AMM, the old one drains, and the book is left pricing collateral off a pool with nothing in it. The procedure is deliberately slow, because a fast pool-swap is an attack vector wearing a helpful face.

  1. Detection. Pool liquidity below the book's minimum for a sustained period, not at a single instant. The check is the same one used at listing.
  2. New borrows pause. Automatic, no human input. The book keeps accepting repayments, withdrawals and liquidations while the price is still trustworthy.
  3. A replacement is proposed through the normal parameter process on Governance and parameters, with the new pool address, its depth, and the price difference between old and new published before anything changes.
  4. The timelock runs in full. An oracle source change is in the slowest parameter class. Nobody can repoint a book's price feed quickly, including us, including in an emergency.
  5. If no acceptable pool exists, the book is wound down rather than repointed at a bad one. See Delisting and wind-down.

If the pool is drained mid-liquidation

A liquidator seizes meme at the TWAP and then has to sell it. If the pool empties between those two moments the liquidator eats the difference, not the book. The protocol never promises an exit price.

  • The seizure itself is priced at the TWAP read in the liquidating transaction, so the book's accounting is settled before any selling happens.
  • A liquidator using the callback flow on the liquidator guide finds out inside the same transaction and can simply revert, which costs gas and nothing else.
  • What the book loses in this scenario is not money, it is a liquidator: the position stays open, and the book is now in the no-bonus-clears state.

What we do not use, and why

Not usedWhy not
The last tickCheap to move on a memecoin. One trade could set the borrow limit.
A Chainlink or Chronicle feedThere is no professional feed for a two-week-old meme, and there never will be. This is the trade that makes the whole protocol possible and it is also its biggest weakness. Aave rejects DEX TWAPs as a primary source for exactly this reason; we are pricing assets Aave would not list at all.
A median across several poolsConsidered. It fails on memecoins because the second and third pools are usually too thin to median against, and a thin pool in the median is an attack surface rather than a safeguard.
An off-chain or signed priceAnything we cannot rebuild from chain data ourselves is something you have to trust us about.

Listing checklist

A ticker gets a book only if every line is true. Not most of them.

Mint authority revoked. If someone can still print more supply, we do not list it. No exceptions.
Freeze authority revoked. A meme someone else can freeze is not collateral.
A canonical pool named at listing, deep enough to absorb a liquidation of the book's full borrow cap.
Minimum liquidity in that pool, measured over a window, not at a single moment. TBD
Minimum age for the league it enters. TBD
A normal token. No balances that change on their own, no tax on transfers, nothing that can block a transfer during a liquidation.
A borrow cap set from the pool's real depth, low at first.

Listed means the meme can be used as collateral. It does not mean the meme is safe to hold.

Authorities, and what we check

CheckWhy it mattersIf it fails
Mint authorityWhoever holds it can print new supply and crash the price of every meme locked in the book.Not listed
Freeze authorityA frozen token cannot be taken in a liquidation, so the debt can never be recovered.Not listed
LP lockUnlocked liquidity can be pulled out of the pool in the middle of a liquidation.Capped at T3, or not listed
Upgradeable tokenIf someone can change how the token works after listing, every check we ran means nothing.Not listed
Big holdersOne wallet large enough to dump through the pool sets the real worst case.Lower league, lower cap

Chains

Memes from Robinhood Chain, Base, BSC and Solana can live in the LOAN MEME universe. A market only exists on a chain where we have actually deployed, and this table only lists chains that are live.

ChainMarkets liveStatus
No chain yetNoneNothing deployed yet
The table above stays empty until a deployment exists

We do not list a chain we have not shipped on, and we are not affiliated with any chain operator, exchange or brokerage. A meme originating on a given chain may end up listed as collateral; that is not a relationship with anyone.

Liquidations

Liquidations

When your health factor drops below 1, anyone can repay part of your debt and take that much of your meme, plus a bonus. If the meme gaps down too fast for that, the loss stays in that book.

What a liquidation looks like

Three sides are involved: you, the liquidator, and the lenders in that book. Anyone can be the liquidator. No permission, no queue.

  1. 01HF drops below 1price falls

    The TWAP updates and your meme is worth less, or interest has pushed your debt up. Your health factor crosses below 1, and from that moment anyone can liquidate the loan.

    Measured onThe TWAP, not the last tick
    WarningNone
  2. 02Debt repaidstables in

    A liquidator repays part of your debt in stables. Those stables go back into the book, to its lenders.

    WhoAnyone
    Per callUp to the close factor
  3. 03Meme takenmeme out

    In return, the liquidator takes your meme: the value they repaid, plus the bonus. That meme does not come back to you.

    They takeRepaid value + bonus
    Bonus12%, 10 to 15% by book, see the bounds
  4. 04Loan recheckedstop or repeat

    If your health factor is back at 1 or above, it stops there. If not, the loan can be liquidated again, straight away.

    HF 1 or aboveIt stops
    HF still below 1Liquidated again

The bonus, and the two bounds it sits between

The bonus is a fixed 12% of the repaid debt, set between 10 and 15% per book. That is one number, and the thing it has to satisfy is not one condition but two, only one of which holds still. It is worth showing the arithmetic rather than asserting that the number is fine.

Write C for the collateral tokens, P for the oracle price, L for the liquidation threshold, D for the debt, R for the amount repaid in one call, and b for the bonus.

Notationexact
HF = C · P · L / D      Cseized = R (1 + b) / P

The ceiling: a liquidation must leave the book healthier

That is the entire job. If seizing collateral makes the health factor worse, every liquidation drags the position further under and the mechanism is working against itself.

The ceilingexact
HF′ = L (C·P − R(1 + b)) / (D − R) > HF
⇐⇒   1 + b < HF / L
At the moment of liquidation HF = 1, so the binding condition is simply b < 1/L − 1.
Liquidation thresholdHighest bonus that still helpsA fixed 15% is
0.38  T3163.2%Far inside. Not the binding constraint here.
0.58  T272.4%Comfortable.
0.65  T153.8%Comfortable.
0.8025.0%Still fine.
0.8517.6%Inside, but not by much.
0.9011.1%Self-defeating. Every liquidation pushes the health factor down.

The league thresholds on Leagues and rank are well under 0.80, so the ceiling is unlikely to be what binds. It becomes the binding constraint the moment anyone proposes a high-LTV league, and it is the reason a stablecoin-style 0.90 threshold can never be bolted onto a 15% bonus.

The floor: somebody has to want the trade

The liquidator repays R, sells the seized meme at slippage s, and pays g in gas and financing. Below a certain bonus the trade loses money and no rational bot takes it.

The floorexact
b > (1 + g/R) / (1 − s) − 1
Unlike the ceiling, this bound moves every block, because s depends on how deep the canonical pool is right now and how much is being dumped into it.
30% 20% 10% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% Ceiling at threshold 0.85 — 17.6% Fixed 15% Fixed 10% At 5% exit slippage a liquidator needs 5.79% At 8.64% slippage a fixed 10% bonus stops clearing At 12.61% slippage a fixed 15% bonus stops clearing At 14.54% slippage the floor meets the ceiling: no bonus satisfies both No bonus works Feasible window Exit slippage 30% 20% 10% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% Ceiling at 0.85 — 17.6% Fixed 15% Fixed 10% At 5% exit slippage a liquidator needs 5.79% At 8.64% slippage a fixed 10% bonus stops clearing At 12.61% slippage a fixed 15% bonus stops clearing At 14.54% slippage the floor meets the ceiling: no bonus satisfies both No bonus works Feasible window Exit slippage
Fig. L1 The minimum bonus a liquidator will accept, against exit slippage, with gas and financing at 0.5% of the repay. The shaded area is where a bonus satisfies both bounds. Illustrative, at a 0.85 liquidation threshold.

What the chart says

  • A fixed 10% stops attracting liquidators once exit slippage passes about 8.6%. The 12% default holds to about 10.3%, and a fixed 15% to about 12.6%.
  • Above roughly 14.5% slippage no bonus satisfies both bounds at a 0.85 threshold. The floor has risen above the ceiling and the window has closed. The only remaining exits are a smaller close factor, splitting the liquidation across several blocks, or bad debt.
  • A constant sits correctly between a moving floor and a fixed ceiling at exactly one depth. Everywhere else it is either paying more than it needs to, or not enough to get the job done.

The bonus is set at 12% of the repaid debt, with a range of 10 to 15% by book. This chart is the reason it stays a parameter worth revisiting rather than a settled choice.

Fixed bonus, or reverse auction

Both models end with the same debt repaid. They differ in who decides what the liquidation costs: the parameter file, or the bidders.

HF drops below 1 anyone may act Fixed bonus Reverse auction 12% from the first block Fastest bot wins a race on ordering Full bonus paid every time Starts at 0% rises each block First profitable bid a race on price Clearing bonus and nothing more HF drops below 1 anyone may act Fixed bonus Reverse auction 12% from the first block Starts at 0% rises each block Fastest bot wins a race on ordering First profitable bid a race on price Full bonus paid every time Clearing bonus and nothing more
Fig. L2 Under a fixed bonus the competition is for transaction ordering, which is why the surplus leaks to the block builder rather than staying in the book. Under an auction the competition is on price, and the winning bid is the market's own estimate of what the liquidation costs.

An auction turns the bonus into a discovered price. It opens at zero and rises until a bidder's profit turns positive, which is precisely the floor from the chart above. Everything between that clearing point and the fixed number is value the fixed model gives away by construction.

25% 20% 10% 0% 0 s 100 s 200 s 300 s Fixed bonus, paid from block one — 12% Clearing bonus at 5% slippage — 5.79% Auction clears, 87 s 87 seconds in, the bonus reaches 5.79% and the first bot fills Seconds since liquidatable 25% 20% 10% 0% 0 s 100 s 200 s 300 s Fixed bonus 12% Clearing bonus — 5.79% Auction clears, 87 s 87 seconds in, the bonus reaches 5.79% and the first bot fills Seconds since liquidatable
Fig. L3 An illustrative ramp, 0 to 20% over five minutes, against the fixed 12%, at 5% exit slippage. The gap between the two lines at the clearing point is the value the fixed model hands over.
Fixed 12% pays$1,200On a $10,000 liquidation, from the first block, regardless of depth.
Auction clears at$579The bonus that actually makes the trade worth doing at 5% slippage.
Difference$621Stays in the borrower's collateral. It is the same $621 that lands on junior when a seizure is what tips a book into bad debt.

The cost of the auction is latency. The position stays underwater while the ramp runs, which is a real risk on a meme that gaps 40% inside a minute: 87 seconds of price discovery can be 87 seconds during which the collateral stops covering the debt at all. Price discovery against time to close is the trade, and it is the decision this protocol has not yet made.

What gets published, either way

If the fixed bonus stays
  • The liquidation threshold per league with the ceiling check shown, as in the table above.
  • The slippage depth each book's bonus, 12% by default, is priced for, and the pool depth that implies.
  • A worked example at the boundary, not on a comfortable position.
If it becomes an auction
  • Start bonus and cap.
  • Ramp length, and whether it steps per block or per second.
  • Whether bidding is permissioned. It will not be.

Either way, what happens when no bonus clears gets documented rather than left in a footnote. That path ends in bad debt, and it has its own page: Bad debt.

When no liquidator turns up

This is the failure mode that actually costs lenders money, and it is not hypothetical. A meme that has just fallen 70% has wide spreads and thin depth exactly when the protocol needs someone to absorb a large sale.

  1. The position sits. It is liquidatable, nobody liquidates, and interest keeps accruing on top. The health factor keeps falling.
  2. The shortfall is published as unrealised on the book's book’s status page and in the subgraph. Nothing has hit any share price yet.
  3. New borrows in that book pause under the pool-depth rule, so the hole cannot get bigger while nobody can close it. See Emergency procedures.
  4. It resolves one of three ways. The price recovers and the position comes back over 1. Depth returns and a liquidator clears it at a loss smaller than the wait cost. Or the book is wound down and the shortfall is realised against the waterfall.
There is no mechanism that forces a liquidation

Nobody can be made to take a losing trade, and the protocol has no capital of its own to take it with. If a book reaches this state, lenders in it are waiting on the market, not on us.

How not to get liquidated

  • Borrow well under the max. The gap between what you borrowed and the liquidation threshold is your whole buffer.
  • Watch the debt, not just the price. Interest moves your HF on a flat chart.
  • Repay early. Partial repayments work and count straight away.
  • Watch the league. A demotion tightens the threshold on your open loan. See Leagues.
  • Do not borrow to buy more of the meme you posted. When it drops, you lose on the extra meme and get liquidated sooner on the loan.

Liquidator guide

For the people running the bots. How to find a liquidatable position, what to call, what you get paid, and the exact point at which it stops being worth doing.

Nothing is deployed

The interfaces on this page are the intended shape, not a deployed ABI. They will be republished and frozen against the audited contract before any book opens. Build against them at your own pace; do not assume the selectors are final.

Why this page exists

Liquidators are not a nice-to-have. A book stays solvent only if someone is watching it and acting within minutes of a health factor crossing 1. If nobody finds it profitable to do that, positions sit underwater, the gap widens, and the loss lands on lenders. Everything on this page is written to make the job easy enough that it gets done.

Finding liquidatable positions

Three ways, in rough order of how fast they are.

1. Read the book directly

Cheapest per call, and the only source that cannot be stale.

// Health factor, 1e18 = exactly 1.0
function healthFactor(address borrower) external view returns (uint256);

// True when healthFactor < 1e18
function isLiquidatable(address borrower) external view returns (bool);

// The most you may repay on this position right now, in loan-asset base units.
// Already has the close factor applied.
function maxRepay(address borrower) external view returns (uint256);

// What you would get for a given repay, before your own swap costs
function previewLiquidate(address borrower, uint256 repayAmount)
    external view returns (
        uint256 collateralOut,   // meme base units you receive
        uint256 bonusValue,      // the bonus portion, in loan-asset units
        uint256 protocolCut      // the slice routed to the book reserve
    );

A multicall over the borrower set of one book costs a single RPC round trip. The borrower set comes from Borrow events, or from the subgraph below.

2. Watch the events

Every state change that can move a health factor emits. Watching these is enough to keep a local index without re-reading the whole book.

event Borrow   (address indexed book, address indexed borrower, uint256 assets, uint256 shares);
event Repay    (address indexed book, address indexed borrower, uint256 assets, uint256 shares);
event Deposit  (address indexed book, address indexed borrower, uint256 collateral);
event Withdraw (address indexed book, address indexed borrower, uint256 collateral);
event PriceUpdate (address indexed book, uint256 twap, uint256 observedAt);
event Liquidate(address indexed book, address indexed borrower, address indexed liquidator,
                uint256 repaid, uint256 seized, uint256 bonusValue);
event BadDebt  (address indexed book, address indexed borrower, uint256 amount);
event BorrowsPaused (address indexed book, uint8 reason);

PriceUpdate is the one that matters. Between two price updates no position in that book can become liquidatable on price, only on interest, and interest is predictable. Recomputing the whole book on each PriceUpdate is the simple correct strategy.

3. Query the subgraph

Easiest to start with, one block behind at best. Endpoint TBD.

{
  positions(
    first: 100
    orderBy: healthFactor
    orderDirection: asc
    where: { healthFactor_lt: "1000000000000000000", debtShares_gt: "0" }
  ) {
    borrower
    book { id  ticker  league  liquidationThreshold  liquidationBonus }
    collateral
    debt
    healthFactor
  }
}

The call

function liquidate(
    address borrower,
    uint256 repayAmount,     // or type(uint256).max for the full close factor
    address collateralTo,    // where the seized meme is sent
    bytes calldata data      // empty: you pay up front. non-empty: callback, see below.
) external returns (uint256 repaid, uint256 seized);

With empty data, the book pulls repayAmount of the loan asset from you first and sends the meme after, so you need the stables in hand and an allowance set.

The callback flow, so you do not need a flash loan

Pass non-empty data and the order reverses: the book sends you the seized meme, calls you back, and only checks it has been repaid when you return. Sell inside the callback and repay from the proceeds.

interface ILoanMemeLiquidateCallback {
    function onLoanMemeLiquidate(
        uint256 repaid,   // what you must have transferred back by the time you return
        uint256 seized,   // meme base units already sitting in your contract
        bytes calldata data
    ) external;
}

This removes the flash-loan fee from your cost model entirely. A flash loan still works if you prefer it, from anywhere; the protocol does not offer one and does not charge for one. See Fees.

How much you can repay

The close factor caps a single call. It is not a fixed fraction: a position that is only slightly underwater gets a partial liquidation, and one that is badly underwater can be closed in full, because leaving a dust position behind helps nobody.

PositionClose factorWhy
Slightly underwaterTBD, a partial close A partial repay is enough to push the health factor back over 1 at any bonus inside the ceiling. Taking more than that is value taken from the borrower for no gain to the book.
Badly underwaterTBD, expected to be a full close A partial liquidation here often leaves the position still below 1, which just means paying gas twice. Close it.
Debt under the dust floorTBD, a full close A position too small to be worth a second transaction is closed in one. Floor TBD.
Collateral worth less than the debtCapped by the collateral You cannot be seized more meme than exists. The cap is collateralValue / (1 + bonus), and what is left over becomes bad debt.

Both the fractions and the health factor they switch at are TBD. What is settled is the shape: a partial close near 1, a full close well below it, and a hard cap once the collateral runs out. maxRepay() always returns the live answer, so read it rather than reimplementing this table.

The profitability model

You repay R, receive collateral worth R(1 + b) at the TWAP, sell it at slippage s, and pay g in gas and any borrowing cost.

Liquidator profitexact
profit = R × (1 + b) × (1 − s) − R − g
profitable when   b > (1 + g/R) / (1 − s) − 1
The floor moves with pool depth every block, because s is a function of how much you are dumping into what depth. The bonus does not move. That is the whole tension on Liquidations.
BonusBreak-even exit slippageProfit on a $25,000 repay at 5% slippage
10%8.64%$1,000
12%10.27%$1,475
15%12.61%$2,187.50

Assuming g at 0.5% of the repay. Above the break-even column the trade loses money and a rational bot does not take it, which is exactly when a book most needs one to.

Gas, roughly

PathGasNote
liquidate, stables in handTBDNo callback, no swap
liquidate with callback and one AMM hopTBDThe usual path
liquidate with callback and a routed swapTBDMulti-hop through an aggregator
healthFactor, per borrowerviewFree off-chain, batch it

Nothing is deployed, so nothing has been measured. These are published as soon as there is a testnet to measure them on.

What we will and will not do about MEV

A fixed bonus makes liquidation a race for transaction ordering rather than a contest on price, so most of the bonus on a competitive book ends up with the block builder rather than with you. We are not going to pretend otherwise.

  • Liquidation is permissionless and stays that way. No allowlist, no keeper set, no private mempool arrangement with a favoured party.
  • There is no protocol-run bot. If we ran one we would be competing with the people we need to show up.
  • The incentive model itself is open. The case for replacing the fixed bonus with a reverse auction, which would move the competition from ordering back to price, is set out in full on Liquidations. It is not decided.

Reference implementation

A minimal working bot, MIT licensed: event listener, position index, profitability filter, callback contract and a simulation harness. It is a starting point, not a competitive edge, and it is deliberately not optimised.

Repository Published with the testnet deployment TBD

Delisting and wind-down

Books get closed. This page is what causes it, what happens to your open loan or your deposit while it is happening, and how long you get.

What closes a book

Two of these are automatic and the rest are decisions. All of them are announced before anything changes.

TriggerAutomaticWhat it means
The canonical pool is goneDetection is Liquidity has left and has not come back, and no acceptable replacement pool exists. The book can no longer be priced, so it cannot be run. See Oracle specification.
A listing condition brokePartly Mint or freeze authority reappeared, the LP lock lapsed, the token contract changed behaviour. Any one of these means the book should never have been open past that moment.
Junior wiped out and not refundedThe pause is The first-loss layer is gone and nobody has replaced it. See Senior and junior.
Sustained bad debtNo The book has realised bad debt it has not earned back, and the reserve target is unreachable at any plausible utilisation.
Nobody is using itNo Near-zero borrows for a long stretch. A book nobody uses is maintenance and attack surface for no benefit.
Legal or sanctionsNo The token or its issuer is subject to something that makes running the book unlawful in the jurisdictions we operate from.

The wind-down procedure

A book is never switched off. It is deprecated, and then it drains. The sequence is fixed, and at no point in it are you prevented from repaying and taking your meme back.

  1. 01Announcednotice starts

    The book is marked deprecated in the interface and on chain. The reason is published at the same time, not later.

    Notice periodTBD
    Borrow capSet to zero immediately
  2. 02Frozenno new anything

    New borrows and new collateral deposits stop. Lender deposits stop. Everything that shrinks the book stays open.

    Still openRepay, withdraw, liquidate
    ClosedBorrow, deposit
  3. 03Rates riserepay pressure

    The book's rate curve is switched to a wind-down curve with a much steeper slope, so that carrying an open loan gets expensive on purpose. This is the only push there is: nothing force-closes a healthy position.

    Applies fromEnd of the notice period
    Liquidation thresholdUnchanged
  4. 04Drainslenders out

    As borrowers repay, stables free up and lenders withdraw. Utilisation still gates withdrawals: a deprecated book with loans still open is not a book you can exit instantly.

    WithdrawalsFirst come, as liquidity frees
    QueueNone. There is no priority list.
  5. 05Closedor left open

    Once debt reaches zero and lenders have withdrawn, the book is done. If loans remain open indefinitely, the book simply stays in this state: it keeps accepting repayments and liquidations forever, because a contract that stops accepting repayment would trap collateral. Nothing is ever self-destructed, and the reserve stays with the book until the last loan closes.

A wind-down does not protect you from liquidation

The liquidation threshold does not change during a wind-down, and liquidations keep running normally throughout. If the meme falls while the book is draining you are liquidated exactly as you would be otherwise. The rising rate makes that more likely, not less, which is why the notice period comes first.

League demotion, which is not a delisting

A demotion moves a book down a league and tightens its terms. The book stays open. It is a much more common event than a delisting and it is the one most likely to affect an open position.

 DemotionDelisting
Book stays openYesNo
Max LTVFalls to the new league'sIrrelevant, borrowing is closed
Liquidation thresholdTightens on every open loanUnchanged
Can liquidate you on the spotYesNo, not by itself
NoticeNotice period plus the slow-class timelock, both TBDTBD
ReversibleYes, a book can be promoted againNo

The mechanics of a demotion, including why there is no grandfathering, are on Governance and parameters.

Appeals and relisting

Can a delisting be appealedThere is no appeal process, because there is no discretion to appeal to. A book is delisted against the conditions above; if the condition was met, the decision stands, and if it was not, that is a mistake to correct rather than a case to argue.
Can a delisted ticker be relistedYes, as a new book, from scratch. It re-enters at T3 regardless of what league it left, passes the full listing checklist again, and carries no history forward. The old book is not reopened.
Does the old book's bad debt follow itNo. The new book is a different contract with different lenders. Carrying a loss across would break the isolation the whole protocol is built on.
Can a demotion be appealedNo, and it is not a judgement. Leagues are set on measurable on-chain properties, so the way to move back up is for those properties to change. See What moves a ticker up.
Does paying us helpNo. There is no paid tier, no listing fee, and no relisting fee. See Fees.

If you are a lender in a book being wound down

  • Your deposit is not locked, but it is not liquid either. You can withdraw whatever share of the book is not currently lent out, the same as any other day. The difference is that no new deposits are arriving to free up more.
  • Your yield usually goes up first. The wind-down rate curve is steeper, so while borrowers are still repaying you are earning more on a shrinking base.
  • The last lenders out wait the longest. If a borrower never repays and is never liquidatable, their loan can outlast your patience. There is no mechanism that ends it.
  • Junior still sits in front of senior throughout, and the waterfall on Bad debt is unchanged by a wind-down.

Governance and parameters

Who can change what, how long it takes, and what you can do about it in the meantime. There is no DAO and we are not going to pretend there is one.

Every change on this page is executed only by the audited contract

No parameter is applied by hand, by a script, or by anyone typing a value into a console. A change is proposed, queued in the timelock and executed by the audited contract, or it does not happen. Nothing on this page is enforced by policy or by our own restraint: it is enforced by code that has been through an external audit before any book opens. Until that audit is done, nothing is deployed and there is nothing to change.

This protocol is run by a small team behind a multisig

Not a token vote, not a council, not a foundation. Holding $LOAN gives you no say in any parameter on this page. Saying so plainly is more useful than a governance forum nobody reads, and it means the only thing standing between a parameter and your position is the timelock.

Who holds what

Owner multisigHolds every parameter-changing role. Threshold TBD of TBD signers. It can only propose changes into the timelock; it cannot execute one directly, and it cannot move user funds.
TimelockEvery parameter change is queued here first and executed by the contract once the delay has run. The queue is public from the moment a change is proposed.
GuardianA single address that can pause, and only pause. It cannot change a parameter, cannot unpause, and cannot touch funds. See Emergency procedures.
NobodyThere is no role that can move a lender's deposit, seize collateral outside a liquidation, mint shares, or spend a book's reserve on anything other than that book's bad debt.

Parameter classes and their delays

The rule is simple: the more a change can hurt someone with an open position, the longer it takes. Anything that can make an existing loan liquidatable sits in the slowest class. The classes are settled; the delays attached to them are not.

ClassParametersTimelockWho can propose
Slow Liquidation threshold, max LTV, league assignment, oracle source and TWAP window, liquidation bonus, close factor, junior-to-senior cap TBD, the longest delay Owner multisig
Standard Interest rate curve, reserve factor, protocol share of the bonus, deposit, withdrawal, origination and repayment fees, junior cooldown TBD, shorter than slow Owner multisig
Fast, safety only Lowering a borrow cap, pausing new borrows, adding a book to the delisting queue None Owner multisig or guardian
Never Anything that moves user funds, changes a deployed book's logic, or spends a reserve on something other than that book's bad debt Not possible No role has this power

The asymmetry in the fast class is deliberate: a change can be made instantly only if it can make the protocol safer and cannot make an existing position worse. Lowering a borrow cap stops new risk and does nothing to an open loan. Raising one takes the standard delay.

League demotion, specifically

This is the change most likely to affect you personally, because it tightens the liquidation threshold on a loan you already have open. It is treated as a slow change with an extra step.

  1. The demotion is announced the moment it is queued, in the interface and on chain.
  2. A notice period runs before the timelock even starts. Length TBD, so the total warning is the notice plus the slow-class delay.
  3. The new threshold applies to every open loan in that book when it takes effect, not only to new ones. There is no grandfathering, because a book with two liquidation thresholds in it is a book nobody can reason about.
  4. During the notice period the borrow cap is lowered immediately under the fast class, so the book does not take on more exposure at terms that are about to change.
A demotion can liquidate you

If your health factor is above 1 at the old threshold and below 1 at the new one, you are liquidatable the block the change lands. Nothing catches you. The notice period exists so that you have time to repay or add collateral, and it is the only protection there is. See Health factor.

Upgradeability

ContractUpgradeableBy whom
Book (market) contractsNoNobody. Deployed immutable. A change means a new book and a wind-down of the old one.
Collateral lockerNoNobody.
Oracle adapterNo, but repointableOwner multisig, slow class. The adapter cannot be replaced with different logic, only pointed at a different canonical pool.
Interest rate modelSwappable per bookOwner multisig, standard class. The model is a separate contract, and swapping it cannot retroactively change accrued interest.
Fee routerYesOwner multisig, standard class. It only ever handles protocol revenue, never lender or borrower principal.
Interface and docsYesThe team, any time. Neither holds funds.

The change log

Every executed parameter change gets a row here: what changed, from what to what, when it was queued, when it executed, and why. Including the changes that make the protocol look bad.

DateBookParameterFrom → toReason
————Nothing is deployed, so nothing has changed.

Emergency procedures

What pauses a book, what keeps working while it is paused, who can press the button, and what they cannot do with it.

The pause rule

A pause stops new borrows in one book. Nothing else, and never across the whole protocol. These are the exact conditions, and all but the last are automatic: no human decides, and no human can stop it happening.

ConditionTriggerAutomaticClears when
Pool too thin Canonical pool liquidity below the book's minimum, sustained over a window rather than at an instant YesDepth recovers for a full window
Stale price No fresh observation for longer than staleAfter. See Oracle specification. YesA fresh observation lands
Deviation breach The TWAP moves more than maxDeviation in a window YesOne full window confirms the new price
Borrow cap reached Outstanding debt at the book's cap. See Borrow caps and pool depth. YesDebt falls below the cap, or the cap is raised through the timelock
Junior wiped out The junior tranche in that book hits zero. See Senior and junior. YesA fresh junior tranche is funded, or the book is wound down
Guardian pause A person presses it, because something is happening that no rule anticipated NoOnly the owner multisig can unpause, never the guardian
The automatic conditions are enforced by the contract

Five of the six pauses above are conditions the book checks itself. Nobody triggers them and nobody can suppress them, including us. They are part of the audited contract rather than an operational promise. See Governance and parameters.

What still works while a book is paused

A pause is not a freeze. Every action that reduces risk stays open, in every pause condition above, without exception.

Still works
  • Repay. Always, in full or in part. There is no state in which you cannot get your meme back by paying what you owe.
  • Withdraw collateral, as long as the loan stays healthy afterwards.
  • Lender withdrawals, to the extent the book has free stables.
  • Liquidations, except under a stale price or a deviation breach, where the price itself is what is in doubt.
  • Lender deposits. More stables in a paused book is not a risk to anyone.
Stops
  • New borrows in that book.
  • Increasing an existing borrow.
  • Nothing else.

Pause, freeze, deprecate

Three different things that get used interchangeably elsewhere. Here they mean exactly this:

StateWhat stopsReversibleWho
PausedNew borrows onlyYes, usually by itself Automatic, or guardian
FrozenNew borrows and new collateral deposits. The book accepts only repayment, withdrawal and liquidation.Yes, by the owner multisig Owner multisig, fast class
DeprecatedThe book is being wound down and will not reopen. Borrow caps go to zero and the delisting procedure starts.No Owner multisig, slow class. See Delisting and wind-down.

The guardian, and its limits

One address exists that can act without a timelock, because some failures are faster than a timelock. It is deliberately the weakest emergency power that is still worth having, and its limits are enforced by the contract rather than by policy.

The guardian can
  • Pause new borrows in one book, or in every book at once.
  • Freeze a book, which additionally stops new collateral deposits.
  • Do both instantly, with no delay and no second signature.
The guardian cannot
  • Unpause or unfreeze anything. Only the owner multisig can, so a rogue guardian can be a nuisance but not a thief.
  • Stop a repayment, a withdrawal or a liquidation.
  • Change any parameter, including a borrow cap.
  • Move, seize or route a single token of anyone's money.

Guardian address: TBD, published before any book opens.

The $LOAN Flywheel

The $LOAN Flywheel

The meme is the culture. The protocol is the engine. Protocol revenue buys back the meme. You do not need to hold it to lend or borrow.

What the token does

It does

  • Carry the brand. It is the thing people hold and post, with the Yeti as its face.

  • Get bought on the open market with protocol fees.

  • Stay out of the lending books. It is not collateral, so no book can liquidate it.

  • Meet the same standard as every listed meme: mint and freeze revoked, contract verified, wallets published.

The Flywheel

  1. 01Fees build upstables in

    Fees collect in stables inside each book: the 2.5% fees on deposits, withdrawals, borrows and repayments, the 20% slice of borrow interest, and 10% of the liquidation bonus. There is no listing fee and there never will be. Every fee is on Fees.

    FromFees, interest and liquidations
    Held inStables, per book
  2. 02The reserve comes firstreserve

    The book's reserve is served before anything else. A book with bad debt sends nothing to buybacks.

    Paid firstThe book's reserve
    Bad debtNothing to buybacks
  3. 03The rest is movedto buyback

    What is left goes, on a schedule, to the buyback contract.

    Goes toThe buyback contract
    ScheduleTBD
  4. 04It buys LOAN MEMEopen market

    The buyback contract buys the token on the open market. No private deals.

    BuysLOAN MEME
    WhereOpen market only
  5. 05Every step is publishedon chain

    Each step above goes out with its transaction hashes, so anyone can check it on chain.

Only earned money buys the token

Never treasury sales, never borrowed money, never newly minted tokens called revenue. Small fees mean a small buyback, and we publish the small number instead of dressing it up.

What happens to the tokens once bought, burn or hold, is TBD, and gets decided before routing goes live.

The token is a memecoin

It can go to zero. Buybacks are a mechanism, not a price floor and not a promise of a return. The token is not in any lending book, but if the protocol has a bad day, the token will feel it in price anyway.

Risks

Everything that can cost you money here, in one place, including the ones we cannot do anything about and the ones that are our fault.

Read this before you read the rest of the docs, not after

Borrowers can lose the posted meme permanently. Lenders can lose part or all of a deposit. Nothing here is insured, nothing is guaranteed, and there is no backstop that always pays. If any single item on this page is unacceptable to you, that is a complete reason not to use the protocol.

Protocol and contract risk

RiskWho it hitsWhat we do about itWhat is left
Smart contract bugEveryone, both sides An external audit before any book opens, immutable book contracts, and low caps at launch. A bug can take everything in a book, or in every book. Audited protocols are exploited regularly. This is the largest single risk on the page.
Novel tranche logicLenders, junior first A separate audit scope for the waterfall, and it does not ship if it cannot be built safely. See Senior and junior. Few precedents in DeFi means few known attacks, which is not the same as none.
Admin key and governanceEveryone Timelocks by parameter class, a guardian that can only pause, and no role that can move funds. See Governance. The multisig is a trusted party. A timelock limits how fast it can hurt you, not whether it can. A compromised multisig plus a slow-class change gives you the length of the timelock as warning, and nothing more.
Upgrade of a dependencyEveryone in a book The rate model and fee router are the only swappable pieces, and neither holds principal. A malicious rate model could make borrowing ruinously expensive. It could not seize anything.

Oracle risk

RiskWho it hitsWhat we do about itWhat is left
TWAP manipulationLenders mostly Long windows sized per league, minimum cardinality, a deviation circuit breaker, and borrow caps tied to pool depth. See Oracle specification. An attacker willing to hold a price away from the market for a full window can still push it. On a thin T3 pool that is cheaper than it sounds, and the defence is the borrow cap rather than the oracle.
TWAP lag in a crashLenders Nothing. It is inherent. In a fast dump the TWAP reads higher than the real price, liquidations fire late, and the gap becomes bad debt. This is the direct cost of a price that is expensive to manipulate.
Canonical pool dies or migratesEveryone in that book Automatic pause on depth, a slow-class process to repoint, and wind-down if no acceptable pool exists. A book can be stuck: unpriceable, unliquidatable, with loans open.
Stale priceBoth sides Automatic pause of borrows and liquidations. Pausing liquidations on a stale price means a genuinely underwater position stays open. We chose that over seizing on a price we do not trust.

Liquidation and MEV risk

RiskWho it hitsWhat we do about itWhat is left
Liquidated at a bad momentBorrowers The gap between max LTV and the liquidation threshold, and nothing else. There is no warning, no grace period, no appeal, and no partial protection. A wick that moves the TWAP is enough. The meme does not come back if the price recovers an hour later.
MEV and priority auctionsBorrowers, indirectly Nothing today. The case for a reverse auction, which would move competition from ordering to price, is on Liquidations. A fixed bonus makes liquidation a race on ordering, so most of the bonus leaks to the block builder. The borrower pays the full bonus either way.
Sandwiching around a liquidationBorrowers and lenders Nothing at the protocol level. Seizure is priced at the TWAP, so a sandwich cannot change what the book records. A searcher can move the pool around a liquidation and worsen the price the seized meme actually sells into, which raises the effective slippage and makes the next liquidation harder to clear.
Nobody liquidatesLenders Publishing the profitability model so bots can be built. See Liquidator guide. Nobody can be forced to take a losing trade and the protocol has no capital to take it with. This is how most bad debt will actually happen.
Cascading liquidationsEveryone in that book Borrow caps sized against pool depth, so the book's full liquidation should be absorbable. The cap is set against depth at a point in time. Depth leaves faster than a cap can be lowered.

Market and asset risk

RiskWho it hitsWhat is left
The meme goes to zeroBorrowers, then lenders Memecoins go to zero routinely. That is the asset class. Isolation means it costs only that book's lenders, not that it costs nobody.
Bad debtLenders in that book, junior first Absorbed by the reserve, then junior, then senior, and there is no fourth layer. See Bad debt.
The stable loses its pegEvery lender, every book You hold the loan asset. If it stops being worth a dollar, that is your loss and nothing here offsets it. The book still balances, in a token worth less.
Stablecoin freeze or blacklistEveryone in that book Centrally issued stables can freeze an address. If a book's address is frozen, the stables in it cannot move: lenders cannot withdraw, borrowers cannot repay, liquidators cannot repay either. Nothing in this protocol can unfreeze it, and no design choice available to us removes this.
Rate collapseLenders Borrowing demand dries up, utilisation falls, and idle stables earn close to nothing. Nothing has gone wrong; the book is simply unused.
Cannot withdrawLenders At 100% utilisation there is nothing free to withdraw until a borrower repays or new deposits arrive. Junior is additionally gated by the subordination cap and cooldown.

Chain and infrastructure risk

RiskWho it hitsWhat is left
Chain haltEveryone on that chain Nothing settles. You cannot repay, withdraw, or liquidate while it is down, and positions that were healthy when it stopped may not be when it restarts. Liquidations then fire all at once into whatever depth exists.
ReorgAnyone acting near the tip A liquidation, repayment or withdrawal can be reversed by a deep reorg. On chains with probabilistic finality, acting on a one-block-old health factor is a risk you are taking.
Sequencer downtimeEveryone on an L2 book Same shape as a halt, with the added case that the price resumes at a very different level from where it stopped.
Bridge failureAnyone whose collateral or stables crossed a bridge If a book's meme or loan asset is a bridged representation, the bridge is a dependency the protocol cannot audit or control. A bridge exploit can leave a book holding a token backed by nothing while the debt against it is still real. Multi-chain books inherit every bridge in the path.
Front end unavailableEveryone The interface is not the protocol. Every action can be taken directly against the contracts. Losing the website should never mean losing access to a position.
RPC or subgraph failureLiquidators most A bot reading a stale index misses liquidations. Read the book directly rather than trusting hosted infrastructure.

Risks that are about you, not us

  • Phishing and fake sites. The realistic way to lose money here is not an exploit of our contracts, it is a convincing copy of this website, or a token carrying the same ticker at a different address. Nothing is deployed, so there is no genuine address to compare against yet, which makes every claim about one false by definition.
  • Approvals. A token approval you granted to something else can drain the meme before it ever reaches a book.
  • Key loss. There is no recovery, no support, and no admin who can move a position to a new address.
  • Borrowing to buy more of the meme you posted. When it drops you lose on the extra meme and get liquidated sooner on the loan. It is the most common way people lose everything here and it is entirely self-inflicted.
  • Tax. A liquidation may be a taxable disposal where you live. We do not report anything to anyone and we cannot advise you.

Risks we do not carry

Listed because knowing what is not a risk is part of understanding the shape of the thing.

  • Contagion between books. A book going bad costs its own lenders and nobody else. No book can be liquidated to cover another.
  • Rehypothecation. Deposited memes sit in the book's locker. They are not lent out, staked, or used to farm anything.
  • A run on the protocol. There is no shared pool to run on. A book at full utilisation gates its own withdrawals and that has no effect on any other book.
  • $LOAN being liquidated. The token is not collateral in any book, so a fall in it cannot trigger anything in the lending markets.

What makes us different

How we compare with Aave, Morpho, Euler and Silo, in short. Including where they are better.

At a glance

 LOAN MEMEAaveMorpho / Euler / Silo
Collateral Memecoins only ETH and other major coins Whatever a curator lists
Markets One separate book per meme One shared pool Separate markets
Price Average price in the meme's main on-chain pool (TWAP) Professional price feeds Chosen by the curator
Lender losses Junior takes the first loss, senior only after Shared by everyone, plus a staked backstop Shared by everyone in the market
Liquidation Fixed 12% bonus, 10 to 15% by book Fixed bonus per asset Euler: an auction that starts at 0%
Who sets the rules The team, behind a timelock. The token votes on nothing. A DAO and risk firms Curators, behind a timelock

What is actually ours

Three things. The rest is a variation on something another protocol shipped first.

  • Memecoins as collateral. Big lenders will not accept a two-week-old meme. We accept that it can go to zero and build around it: low LTVs, a slow average price, borrow caps tied to pool depth, and one book per token so a collapse stays contained.
  • Ordered losses inside each book. Junior lenders take the first loss and earn more for it. Senior lenders earn less and are hit last. Almost no DeFi lender does this. See Senior and junior.
  • Leagues instead of case-by-case rules. Each token is scored on on-chain data and placed in T1, T2 or T3, which sets its terms. Cruder than a risk team, but it works on a meme that launched yesterday. See Leagues and rank.

Where we are weaker

  • The price is our biggest risk. A thin pool can be pushed, and the average lags in a crash. No professional feed exists for new memes. See Oracle and listing.
  • No track record. Nothing is deployed. Aave has survived years of attacks.
  • A small safety net. Each book's reserve only covers small losses. There is no big backstop behind it.
  • Liquidations are not settled. A fixed bonus can be too low to attract liquidators or cost the borrower more than needed. An auction is still an option. See Liquidations.
  • Senior and junior is new. There are few precedents to learn from, and it ships only if it can be built safely.
  • Less flexible. Aave lets you borrow against several assets at once. Here every meme stands alone, which is the price of containing losses.
  • A trusted team. A multisig controls the settings. The timelock slows it down, it does not stop it.

Is it for you?

Use something else if
  • Your collateral is ETH or another major coin.
  • You want a protocol with a track record.
  • You are lending and want the lowest risk possible.
This might fit if
  • You hold a meme, want cash, and do not want to sell it.
  • You want one bad token's losses kept inside its own book.
  • You lend and want to choose your place in the loss order.

Last updated: 18 September 2026

Loan Meme docs Status: not deployed Nothing here is financial advice Risks Press / to search, ← → to change page